Abstract: Prediction and evaluation errors of self-performance (overestimation and underestimation) occasionally bring serious consequences. This study examined possible causes for overestimation and underestimation using a newly devised experimental paradigm. The experiment comprised two sessions: in the first session, participants learned rules for button presses in response to particular combinations of digits, and in the second session, they performed a similar task with the same rules but in response to English letters and they were randomly assigned to one of three tasks with different button configurations: Sequential, Reversed, and Partially reversed. The participants predicted and evaluated their performance before and after each session, respectively. It was found that participants tended to overestimate both predictions and evaluations of performance on the Partially reversed task. These results suggest that differential changes in stimulus-response association lead to differentially biased estimations. In particular, people might underestimate the switching costs from ordinal to non-ordinal representation.
INTRODUCTION
Metacognition, which is the ability to monitor and control one's cognition, constitutes a fundamental part of human cognitive processes [1, 2] . Metacognitive monitoring has often been studied in experiments in which participants are asked to explicitly state some facts and then evaluate the accuracy of their answers (i.e., provide confidence ratings). Differences between evaluation or prediction and actual performance are regarded as overconfidence or underconfidence, which could cause inappropriate actions or consequences. The definition of overconfidence is the overestimation of one's actual ability, performance, level of control, or chance of success. As a familiar example, overconfidence has been associated with accidental injuries [3, 4] . These studies focus on children's overconfidence in their physical abilities and its relationship with accident proneness. Researchers have also offered overconfidence as an explanation for war initiations, entrepreneurial failures, and stock market bubbles [5] [6] [7] [8] . Because of its importance, research on overconfidence has been influential [9] [10] [11] .
Executive control or metacognitive skills can be considered voluntary control over cognitive processes. A substantial amount of research has been conducted on four metacognitive skills: prediction, planning, monitoring, and evaluation [12] . In the present study, we focus on two metacognitive skills: prediction and evaluation, which have been characterized as the elements of "off-line metacognition" [13] . Metacognition is obviously more accurate in evaluation than in prediction since evaluation occurs after a performance. Nevertheless, overestimation and underestimation do occur in the evaluation phase. When actual performance is low, people overestimate their own performance [14] , particularly on general knowledge questions [15, 16] ; this is termed the hard-easy effect. Overestimation of performance is most likely to occur on difficult tasks, on difficult items, or when success is less likely [16] [17] [18] [19] . Previous research has suggested that the tendency toward overconfidence is stronger in cognitive than in perceptual judgments [20] . However, other researchers have replicated the hard-easy effect for both cognitive and perceptual judgments [21] . The results of previous work have not been consistent, and few works on metacognition of configural response learning have been published. In addition, the hard-easy effect was generally considered as a human property and was not discussed as a task property. Therefore, the question of whether differences in specifically configured stimulus-response association cause differential performance and metacognition deserves to be investigated.
Making better products and operational systems requires consideration of actual task performance as well as how people think about their own performance and interaction. For example, even if users improve their performance, they might make mistakes and/or might not perform optimally if they overestimate or underestimate their own performance. Therefore, we were 
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People usually have representations about operational procedures of products and update them when they encounter a new or unaccustomed operation. In general, mental representations of numerical magnitudes are associated with space (spatial-numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect [22] ) on the basis of a mental number line [23] . Spatial representation of ordinal information is not limited to numbers. Letters (more specifically, those from the Latin alphabet) tend to be mapped onto space in a left-to-right order [24] . In this study, we prepared three different letter-space configurations: Sequential . By using a newly devised paradigm, we examined (1) which types of stimulusresponse association would result in overestimation or underestimation, (2) whether metacognition (i.e., overestimation and underestimation) would be changed or modified from prediction to evaluation, and (3) the properties of those stimulus configurations. We adopted and modified the framework of the reduction task, which was originally used in studies of skill learning [25] [26] [27] [28] . The experiment comprised two sessions: in the first session, participants learned rules for button presses in response to particular combinations of digits, and in the second session, they were randomly assigned to one of three tasks with different button configurations: Sequential, Reversed, and Partially reversed and they performed a similar task with the same rules but in response to English letters. In the second session, if we observe any overestimation or underestimation in the three different button configurations (Sequential, Reversed, Partially reversed), this observation would reflect relationships between human properties and task properties. For example, if we observe underestimation or overestimation in the Sequential configuration, this indicates that participants do not evaluate switching cost from digits mapping. In addition, if we find underestimation or overestimation in the Reversed configuration, this indicates that participants probably overestimate or underestimate switching costs from accustomed ordinal to unaccustomed ordinal mappings and those from digits mapping. Similarly, if we observe underestimation or overestimation in the Partially reversed configuration, this indicates that participants likely overestimate or underestimate switching costs from ordinal to non-ordinal mapping and those from digits mapping.
Metacognition is closely related to self-efficacy. The self-efficacy theory proposes that many behavioral changes operate through a common mechanism: the alternation of the individual's expectations of personal mastery and success [29, 30] . This theory mentions two types of expectancies that exert powerful influences on behavior. One is outcome expectancy, the belief that certain behaviors will lead to certain outcomes. The other is self-efficacy expectancy, the belief that one can successfully perform current tasks [31] . According to Bandura [29] , self-efficacy expectancy is the most powerful determinant of behavioral change because it motivates the initial decision to perform a task, the error committed, and persistence in the face of adversity. For example, previous work has shown a correlation between grade point average and academic self-efficacy. That is, the higher students' academic self-efficacy is, the better the grades they earn [32] . Shere and Maddux [31] proposed a "Self-efficacy Scale" comprising 23 items (including such examples as, "When I make plans, I am certain I can make them work," "Failure just makes me try harder," etc.). We employed this Self-efficacy Scale in the present experiment.
METHODS
Participants
Fifty-eight people participated in the experiment (35 males and 23 females; mean age = 22.4 years, standard deviation = 4.45) 1 . All the participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and normal motor functions and were naïve as to the purpose of this study. All participants provided informed consent prior to participation.
Procedure
The experiment comprised two sessions (i.e., First session and Second session) and questionnaires. Prior to the experiment, the participants were given a clear explanation of the procedures and the rules of the task. They were asked to predict and evaluate their own performance before and after completing the sessions, respectively. They reported their predicted and evaluated performance in terms of percentages (e.g., "I think I will be (was) able to score 85% in this session.").
Before the experiment, the participants answered a questionnaire regarding self-efficacy. In the first sessions, two digits were randomly selected from "1," "2," and "3" and shown at the center of the screen. Participants were asked to press a button as precisely and quickly as possible according to the following rules: (1) If the two digits are the same, press the button corresponding to the digit. For example, if "11" is shown, press "1". (2) If the two digits differ, press the remaining button. For example, if "12" is shown, press "3". One block comprised 5 consecutive trials following a 1000-ms fixation point (Fig. 1a) . The participants were told that responses over 1 sec would be regarded as incorrect responses. Each participant completed 40 blocks comprising a total of 200 trials. The response buttons were arranged in ascending order from left to right (Fig. 1b) . The participants performed 10 habituation trials before the main session.
In the second session, the participants performed a similar task, but the numbers were replaced by the letters "A," "B," and "C" (Fig. 1c) . The rules were (1) if the two letters presented are the same, press the button corresponding to the letter. For example, if "AA" is shown, press [A]. (2) If the two letters differ, press the remaining button. For example, if "AB" is shown, press [C]. For the only second session, the participants were randomly assigned to one of three tasks that varied in terms of the configurations of the response buttons (Fig. 1d) . 
RESULTS
Self-efficacy scale
The overall self-efficacy score was calculated by summing individual item scores given on a 5-point scale (i.e., 23 × 5 = 115 points is the maximum possible score; mean score = 82.2, standard deviation = 12.29). Higher scores indicate that participants are more confident in what they do. In order to confirm whether prediction or evaluation is related to the personality trait of self-efficacy in the present experiment, we conducted a correlation analysis. The results revealed that there was no significant correlation between self-efficacy scale scores and average predictions or evaluations of the test session (t(41) = 0.83, p = 0.41, r = 0.13). Hence, in the present study, prediction and evaluation of performance seemed to be independent of participants' self-efficacy.
The first session (with digits)
We excluded participants with correct response rates below 70% in the first session and participants with more than 20% difference between actual score and self-evaluation because they were considered to lack ordinary performance and/or metacognition in terms of performance estimation. In total, 16 participants were excluded, and there remained 17 participants in the Sequential configuration group, 12 participants in the Reversed configuration group, and 13 participants in the Partially reversed configuration group. Figure 2 presents the results of the first session. The tasks in the second session were assigned after the first session; therefore, at the time of the first session, there were no differences among the three task groups because all the participants conducted the first session with the same button configuration. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) confirmed that the main effect of task group was not significant (F(2, 39) = 1.07, p = 0.35). Next, we calculated the differences between prediction and score (hereafter referred to as prediction error: prediction -score) and between evaluation and score (hereafter referred to as evaluation error: evaluationscore) separately for the three task groups. The main effect of task group was not significant (F(2, 39) . Thus, as predicted, there was no difference among the three task groups in terms of actual performance, performance prediction, or performance evaluation in the first session. However, there was a general tendency toward underestimation of performance prediction. Figure 3 presents the results of the second session. A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of task group (F(2, 39) = 9.61, p < 0.001; post hoc Shaffer's method, Sequential = Reversed > Partially reversed, p < 0.01; Fig. 3a) .
The second session (with letters in different button configurations)
Prediciton error (Fig. 3b) in the Sequential group was not significantly different from zero (t(16) = 1.56, adjusted p-value = 0.41), that in the Reversed group was marginally larger than zero (t(11) = 2.60, adjusted p-value = 0.07; i.e., underestimation), and that in the Partially reversed group was significantly smaller than zero (t(12) = -3.2, adjusted p-value < 0.05; i.e., overestimation). Evaluation error (Fig. 3b) in both the Sequential and Reversed groups was not significantly different from zero (adjusted pvalues > 0. 22) , while that in the Partially reversed group was significantly smaller than zero (t(12) = -3.14, adjusted p-value < 0.05; i.e., overestimation).
There was a significant transfer (i.e., learning effect) from the first session to the second session in the Sequential group (Fig. 4) ; paired t-tests revealed marginally significant differences bewteen actual scores in the first session and those in the second session in the Sequential group (t(16) = -1.98, p = 0.06, first > second).
In order to verify whether the participants in the Sequential group realized that they experienced a learning effect, we examined differences in actual score (i.e., the degree of transfer) and differences in evaluation (i.e., realization of transfer) between the preliminary and test sessions (Fig. 5) . The degree of transfer did not show a significant correlation with the participants' degree of perception of transfer (t(15) = -1.56, p = 0.14, r = -0.37).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we examined which types of changes in stimulus-response association would lead to overestimation or underestimation of performance. The results can be summarized in the following manner: (1) the Partially reversed configuration led to overestimation in both prediction and evaluation. (2) In the second session, the Partially reversed task was the most difficult in terms of actual performance. (3) The participants in the Sequential group did not correctly evaluate the learning effect from the first session to the second session (underconfidence with practice [UWP]; [19] ).
We discuss the differences between prediction or evaluation and actual performance. We found that the participants who performed the Partially reversed task overestimated their performance in both prediction and evaluation; those in the Reversed task tended to underestimate their performance in prediction but could evaluate their performance correctly, and those in the Sequential task could predict and evaluate their performance correctly. In other words, the Partially reversed configuration led to overestimation, thereby indicating that participants could not adjust their metacognition in evaluation; this is consistent with the hard-easy effect because the results showed that the Partially reversed task was the most difficult one (Fig. 3a) . Overestimation of performance is most likely to occur on difficult tasks, on difficult items, or when success is less likely [16] [17] [18] [19] . This finding indicates that performance of not only general knowledge questions but also of configural response learning could lead to overestimation or underestimation under specific conditions. Although the Reversed task group showed a tendency toward underestimation in the prediction phase, this tendency did not reach significance. It remains to be investigated whether an easier cognitive task would lead to underestimation. One possible interpretation is a ceiling effect. As performance in the Sequential and Reversed conditions was relatively high (over 85%), it was likely that underestimation of their performance did not occur because underestimation would require estimation to be lower than actual performance.
In terms of difficulty of the second session (i.e., a task property), the Partially reversed task was more difficult than the Sequential and Reversed tasks. Additionally, the Reversed task was not more difficult than the Sequential task. The association between ordinal information and space, once established, seems to become an automatic and obligatory process that occurs without intention or conscious monitoring [33] . Numerous studies have also indicated that the correspondence between ordinal information and space is flexible. If numbers are represented mentally in descending order, the mapping between numbers and spaces is also reversed [34] [35] [36] [37] . ) is also relatively easy to process [34] . It should be noted that the number of changes in the components of the button configurations was the same between the Reversed and the Partially reversed conditions. Thus, reversing the spatial representation of ordinal information by top-down processes [38] seems to be easier than breaking the ordinal order. As for metacognition in the Partially reversed condition, people might overestimate task performance using an unaccustomed and non-ordinal representation. However, participants in the Reversed condition could evaluate their performance correctly (unaccustomed ordinal mapping). Therefore, the participants in the Partially reversed condition seem to underestimate the so-called switching costs from ordinal to non-ordinal representation.
A learning effect was observed in the Sequential group from the first session to the second session. It indicated that similar button configurations (i.e., accustomed ordinal representations) enhanced transfer even if the stimulus components were changed from digits to letters. However, participants in the Sequential group did not evaluate the learning effect correctly. This UWP effect was found robustly across several experimental manipulations; it occurs irrespective of feedback, self-paced versus fixed-rate presentation, different incentives for correct performance, and conditions producing different degrees of knowledge [19] . In a recent study using the memory-for-past test, Finn and Metcalfe proposed a possible mechanism of UWP [39] . They hypothesized that judgment of learning effects is constrained by performance in previous trials. For example, people had proper judgments of learning effects on items that they answered correctly in previous trials. However, people could not appropriately evaluate the degree of learning effects on items they answered incorrectly in the previous trial. That is, people do not appreciate learning effects occurring in the current trial because they are concerned about several items that they answered inappropriately in previous trials.
The results of the present study may have several implications for interface and work designs. First, the Partially reversed button configuration (i.e., partial change) can produce overconfidence and overestimation. Since numerous product functions have recently begun to be assigned to a limited number of operational buttons, complexity of operation has been steadily increasing. It is essential not to use Partially reversed button configurations in digital interfaces. Second, the UWP effect occurred in the second session. Underestimation would cause inappropriate consequences just as overestimation does. In order not to be influenced by the UWP effect, interfaces need to be made such that they avoid necessitating or exacting learning.
CONCLUSION
Metacognition of one's own ability and performance constitutes one of the determining factors of human performance and human error. The present study investigated overestimation and underestimation of performance using a newly devised paradigm. The results showed that the partial change in stimulus-response association (Partially reversed condition) produced the worst performance. Participants tended to overestimate task performance in the Partially reversed condition. These results suggest that differential changes in stimulusresponse association lead to underestimation or overestimation. People might underestimate the switching costs from ordinal to non-ordinal representation. Further investigations are warranted to examine how the present findings may be related to real-world learning and transfer of task operations.
